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A DECEDENT'S POWERS AS TRUSTEE OF A LIFE
INSURANCE TRUST-TAXABLE "INCIDENTS
OF OWNERSHIP"?
The estate tax treatment of insurance benefits paid on the life of an
insured-decedent has been unsettled since the earliest enactment of the
tax; continuing controversy has marred the interpretation of the statu-
tory language. Congress has amended the estate tax statute governing life
insurance several times, and the regulations and court rulings have been
even more frequently altered. Currently, a direct conflict exists among
the courts of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits over the proper
interpretation of the statute and regulations imposing an estate tax on
life insurance proceeds.
The current statute requires inclusion in the decedent-insured's gross
estate of insurance proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than the
decedent's estate only if the insured possessed any of the incidents of
ownership in the policy at his death.1 Both the regulations and the
courts have attempted to define the phrase "incidents of ownership"; the
statute itself is silent except for a provision that a reversionary interest
1. I.R.C. § 2042 provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(1) Receivable by the executor.-To the extent of the amount receivable by
the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.-To the extent of the amount re-
ceivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the
incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any
other person. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term "incident of
ownership" includes a reverrionary interest (whether arising by the express
terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of law) only if the
value of such reversionary interest exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy
immediately before the death of the decedent. As used in this paragraph, the
term "reversionary interest" includes a possibility that the policy, or the pro-
ceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent or his estate, or may be subject
to a power of disposition by him. The value of a reversionary interest at any
time shall be determined (without regard to the fact of the decedent's death)
by usual methods of valuation, including the use of tables of mortality and ac-
tuarial principles, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his
delegate. In determining the value of a possiblity that the policy or proceeds
thereof may be subject to a power of disposition by the decedent, such possi-
bility shall be valued as if it were a possibility that such policy or proceeds
may return to the decedent or his estate.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 did not change this section.
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exceeding five per cent of the value of the policy immediately before the
decedents death is to be treated as an incident of ownership. Not
surprisingly, interpretations of the Code in the absence of statutory
guidelines have been confusing and conflicting.
The taxation of life insurance trusts is one important area of current
conflict. The popularity of life insurance trusts as estate planning
devices2 heightens the need for fixed interpretation. Nevertheless, a
conflict has arisen in the case of trusts which include in the corpus a life
insurance policy on the decedent's life, and which appoint the decedent
as trustee. The trustee's usual powers over the trust corpus, including
the insurance policy, would normally result in inclusion of the insurance
proceeds in the decedent's gross estate, because such powers constitute
incidents of ownership. In the case of a life insurance trust, however,
the decedent-trustee holds his powers over the insurance policy in a
fiduciary capacity. The issue, therefore, is whether the fiduciary nature
of the decedent's powers sufficiently restrains his ability to benefit
himself through the exercise of those powers so that the powers do not,
or should not, constitute taxable "incidents of ownership." This ques-
tion has been raised with only slight factual variations before the Sec-
ond, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals. The three circuits
have reached contrary conclusions, each court relying on slightly differ-
ent interpretations of the "incidents of ownership" concept.
This Note will review the history of the current statute, focusing
especially on the "incidents of ownership" concept, and attempt to
determine what that term should encompass. The impact of fiduciary
restraints, as exemplified by the recent circuit court decisions, will then
be examined. Finally, the proper resolution of the conflict in the circuit
courts will be suggested.
I. HSTORY OF ESTATE TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE
Congress has made three significant changes in the statutory lan-
guage, in 1918, 1942, and 1954. This section will be divided into three
2. See, e.g., Doyle, Life Insurance in Estate Planning, 22 OHio ST. LJ. 258, 263-
74 (1961); Gordon, Life Insurance as a Planning Tool, 1975 N.Y.U. 33D INST. FED.
TAX. 793; Gordon, Recent Developments in the Use of Life Insurance in Estate
Planning, 22 TI.. TAx. INsT. 477 (1973); McKenny, The Role of Variable Life
Insurance in Estate Planning, 112 TRUSTS & EST. 698 (1973); Simmons, Tax Planning
with Group Term Life Insurance, 11 LAw OFF. EcoN, & MANAGEMENT 483 (1971);
Simmons, Life Insurance Trusts, 12 PRAc. LAw., Oct. 1966, at 63; Comment, The Life
Insurance Trust in Estate Planning, 34 Miss. LJ. 81 (1962).
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parts, corresponding to these three major changes. Each part will
discuss the statutory language, legislative history, judicial decisions, and
treasury regulations interpreting the three versions of the statute.
A. 1918
The first specific inclusion of life insurance in the estate tax pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code is found in the Revenue Act of
1918. Section 402 of that Act listed insurance proceeds among other
kinds of property to be included in the decedent's gross estate:
To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance
taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the extent of the
excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries
as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own
life.3
The principle of splitting insurance taxation into two categories-
insurance payable to the decedent-insured's estate or executor, and in-
surance payable to all other beneficiaries-has been carried forward
from the 1918 Act to the current Code without change. Taxation of
insurance proceeds paid to the decedent's estate or executor has not
created interpretative difficulty, because the benefit to the decedent is
not disputed.4 This Note concerns only the second category of insurance
taxation-the estate tax consequences of life insurance proceeds pay-
able to beneficiaries other than the decedent's estate or executor.
1. The $40,000 Exemption and the Definition of "Life Insurance"
Neither the current statute nor its predecessors explicitly define
life insurance.' Under the 1918 Act, however, it was necessary to de-
fine the term to determine whether property constituted life insurance,
thus qualifying for the $40,000 exemption, or should be treated as
another sort of property not qualifying for the exemption. 6 The first
3. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 2042).
4. See C. LowNDFs, R. KRAMER, & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFr TAXES §
13.2, at 322 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as LowDmES].
5. See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1941). I.R.C. § 2039(a)
(estate taxation of annuities) specifically excludes life insurance without defining it. Nor
does the income tax provision for life insurance define the term. I.R.C. § 101.
6. See, e.g., Keller v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 543, 544-45 (1941); Helvering v. Le
Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 538 (1941); Helvering v. Tyler, 111 F.2d 422, 425-27 (8th Cir.
1940), aft'd, 312 U.S. 657 (1951). The $40,000 exemption was re-enacted without
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Treasury Regulations presented a perfunctory definition of insurance:
"The term 'insurance' refers to life insurance of every description, in-
cluding death benefits paid by fraternal beneficial societies, operating
under the lodge system."7 This definition has never been changed by
the Treasury Regulations and remains the same today." The legislative
history of the Revenue Act of 1918 is not helpful, either; it merely indi-
cates that Congress included the provision taxing insurance benefits in
excess of $40,000 payable to beneficiaries other than the decedent's es-
tate or executor to prevent tax evasion.9
Court decisions have amplified the definition of insurance, holding
that the essence of insurance is an actual "insurance risk" at the time
of the transaction.10 In other words, there must be some element of
risk-shifting from the insured to the insurer and possibly some element
of risk-distribution. Thus, if the benefits payable on the insured's
death cannot exceed the total premiums paid plus interest, there is no
"insurance risk" because the insurer assumes no risk of financial loss.
Aside from the difficulty of defining insurance, courts have faced
a separate problem in defining "life insurance." Courts have held that
the term encompasses group insurance, accidental death benefits,
stock exchange benefits, war risk insurance, and annuity and life in-
surance combinations.-' In 1965, the Third Circuit accepted the tax-
payer's argument that an accidental death policy was not life insurance
because the likelihood of accidental death is extremely low, whereas
a specified sum is certain to be paid on a life insurance policy. 12 The
Supreme Court, however, in its most recent ruling on the estate tax-
ation of life insurance, reversed the Third Circuit's decision. The
change in 1921, 1924, 1926, and 1939. Revenue Act of 1921, clh. 136, § 402(f), 42 Stat.
279; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 302(g), 43 Stat. 305; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 20,
§ 1094(g), 44 Stat. 835; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 122. See
generally 1 A. CAsNER, ESTATE PLANNING 323 n.71 (3d ed. 1961).
7. Treas. Reg. 37, art. 32 (1921 revision), quoted in Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312
U.S. 531, 538 (1941).
8. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (a) (1) (1974).
9. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918); S. RaP. No. 617, 65th
Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1918).
10. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1941); see Ritter v. Mutual Life
Ins., 169 U.S. 139 (1898). For a general discussion of life insurance policies, see Berall,
Use of Life Insurance in Estate Planning-Recent Developments, 1973 N.Y.U. 33D INST.
FaD. TAX. 721; Gordon, Life insurance as a Planning Tool, supra note 2.
11. LOWNDES, supra note 4, at § 13.12.
12. Estate of Noel v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 950, 952 (3d Cir.), rev'd, 380 U.S.
678 (1965).
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Court rejected the evitable-inevitable risk distinction as not viable,
because in either case the risk assumed by the insurer is the insured's
death, and it is that risk upon which payment depends in both cases.' 3
The definition of life insurance has been further refined in cases
disputing the value of the policy for gift tax purposes. In Guggenheim
v. Rasquin,14 for example, the Court faced the issue of the gift tax due
on a single premium policy purchased for $852,000, with a cash sur-
render value of $717,000 and a face value of $1,000,000. Although
the taxpayer argued that the gift tax should be based upon the cash
surrender value, 15 the Commissioner valued the policy at its cost to the
taxpayer. The Court upheld the Commissioner's determination, stating:
[T]he owner of a fully paid life insurance policy has more than the mere
right to surrender it; he has the right to retain it for its investment
virtues and to receive the face amount of the policy upon the insured's
death. That these latter rights are deemed by purchasers of insurance
to have substantial value is clear from the difference between the cost
of a single-premium policy and its immediate or early cash surrender
value .... "I
2. Criterion for Inclusion
The Revenue Act of 1918 did not specify the criterion to determine
whether insurance proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than the
decedent-insured's estate or executor should be included in the dece-
dent's estate. The 1918 Act merely stated that such proceeds were
includible if they were paid "as insurance under policies taken out by
the decedent upon his own life.' 7 This phrase caused more confusion
than any other part of the statute.
The earliest Treasury Regulations attempted to explicate the phrase
"taken out by the decedent upon his own life," stating that insurance
was to be treated as taken out by the decedent
13. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
14. 312 U.S. 254 (1941).
15. I.R.C. § 2512(a) provides that "if a gift is made in property, the value thereof at
the date of the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift." Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1
(1965) provides that "the value of the property is the price at which such property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller. . . . The value is generally
to be determined by ascertaining as a basis the fair market value at the time of the gift
16. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 257 (1941); accord, United States v.
Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260 (1941); Powers v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 259 (1941).
17. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 2042).
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where -he pays the premiums, either directly or indirectly, whether or
not he makes the application. On the other hand, the insurance
should not be included in the gross estate, even though the application
is made by the decedent, where the premiums are actually paid by some
other person or corporation, and not out of funds belonging to, or
advanced by, the decedent.' 8
Thus, the first defined criterion for including insurance proceeds in the
decedent's estate was whether or not he had paid, directly or indirectly,
the premiums on the policy. The 1924 Treasury Regulations carried
forward this definition with slight alterations'0 and the 1926 regulations
re-adopted it without substantial change.2 ° Many courts construing the
1918 Act also supported the view that insurance was "taken out" by the
decedent, regardless of who made application, if he had paid the prem-
iums.2 1
In 1929, however, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case
Chase National Bank v. United States.22 In that case the taxpayer had
purchased three insurance. policies on his life, naming his wife as
beneficiary but reserving the right to change the beneficiary. The
decedent's representatives argued that the estate tax statute imposed a
direct, unapportioned tax on property in contravention of article 1,
sections 2 and 9 of the Constitution. 28  The taxpayer asserted that the
beneficiaries' interest had "vested" in them before the death of the
insured, and that the proceeds were paid to the beneficiaries by the
insurer, not the insured; therefore, no taxable transfer from the dece-
dent-insured had occurred at the moment of the taxpayer's death.
Rejecting the taxpayer's argument, the Court first discussed the concept
of incidents of ownership. The Court stated that the taxpayer had
18. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 32 (1919), quoted in Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264,
268-69 (1938) and Schlesinger, Taxes and Insurance: A Suggested Solution to the
Uncertain Cost of Dying, 55 HAIv. L. Rnv. 226, 230 (1941).
19. Treas. Reg. 68, Art. 25, 28 (1924), quoted in Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S.
264, 269 (1938).
20. The 1926 regulations were the same as the 1924 regulations. Lang v. Commis.
sioner, 304 U.S. 264, 270 (1938).
21. E.g., cases cited Annot., 85 LEd. 1001, 1014 (1941).
22. 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides that "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according
to their respective Numbers ...
U.S. CONS?. art. I, § 9 provides that "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be
laid, unless in Proportion to-the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be
taken."
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retained an incident of ownership-the power to change the benefi-
ciaries and thus dispose of the proceeds-until the moment of his death,
and the termination of this power at death could be treated as a taxable
transfer.24 The Court stated:
A power in the decedent to surrender and cancel the policies, to
pledge them as security for loans and the power to dispose of them and
their proceeds for his own benefit during his life which subjects them to
the control of a bankruptcy court for the benefit of his creditors ...
and which may, under local law applicable to the parties here, subject
them in part to the payment of his debts .. .is by no means the least
substantial of the legal incidents of ownership, and its termination at
his death so as to free the beneficiaries of the policy from the possi-
bility of its exercise would seem no less a transfer within the reach
of the taxing power than a transfer effected in other ways through
death.25
Termination of the power of control at the time of death inures
to the benefit of him who owns the property subject to the power and
thus brings about, at death, the completion of that shifting of the
economic benefits of property which is the real subject of the tax, just
as effectively as would its exercise, which later may be subjected to a
privilege tax .... 26
The Court also rejected the narrow interpretation of "transfer" that
permits taxation only of transfers directly from the decedent: "[the
definition of a taxable transfer] must . .. at least include the transfer
of property procured through expenditures by the decedent with the
purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another."27
Subsequent to the Chase decision, lower courts and the Treasury
Department altered their interpretations of the test for inclusion of life
insurance proceeds with disconcerting frequency, 28 apparently constru-
ing Chase to mean not only that estate tax could be levied on the basis of
incidents of ownership, but also that incidents of ownership was a
prerequisite to taxation. In a ruling issued in 1930, the Treasury
Department amended the determining test to include a requirement of
24. Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1929).
25. Id. at 335.
26. Id. at 338.
27. Id. at 337.
28. See generally LowNrDs, supra note 4, at ch. 13; Schlesinger, supra note 18, at
227-37.
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possession of incidents of ownership.29 In 1932, the Treasury Regula-
tions were again amended to make the test a two-prong one: proceeds of
life insurance were includible in the gross estate only if the decedent had
paid the premuims and possessed incidents of ownership at his death. 0
In 1934, however, new Regulations made the test for inclusion alterna-
tive: either possession of incidents of ownership at death or payment of
premiums by the insured justified including the proceeds in his gross
estate.81 In the 1937 Regulations, however, the Treasury once again
reversed itself, apparently making possession of incidents of ownership
the sole test for taxation.32 Finally, in 1941, the Treasury reversed itself
again, stating that "taken out by the decedent" turned solely upon
whether or not he had paid the policy premiums.31
B. Revenue Act of 1942
Congress attempted to introduce some harmony into this confusing
state of affairs by amending the statute in 1942. The Revenue Bill of
1942 made major changes in the prior statute's language. It totally
eliminated the $40,000 exemption.3 4 It also eliminated the phrase
"policies taken out by the decedent" because that language had
"produced confusion and unnecessary litigation"; 35 the amended statute
specifically enumerated the criterion governing inclusion in the dece-
dent's estate of life insurance proceeds payable to beneficiaries other
than the decedent's estate. The test for inclusion adopted by the 1942
bill was the either-or test previously used to define "taken out by the
decedent": inclusion was justified either if the decedent had paid the
policy premiums or if at death he possessed any incidents of ownership
in the policy.3 6 If the decedent possessed any incident of ownership, the
entire policy amount was includible in his estate; if he had only paid the
premiums, an amount proportionate to the ratio of the premiums paid
29. I.T. 2553, JX-2 C.B. 101 (1930), quoted in Schlesinger, supra note 18, at 232
n.17.
30. Schlesinger, supra note 18, at 233.
31. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 25 (1934), quoted in Schlesinger, supra note 18, at
234.
32. Schlesinger, supra note 18, at 234.
33. Treas. Reg. 80, art. 25, T.D. 5032, 1941-1 C.B. 427-28.
34. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 404(g) (2), 56 Stat. 944.
35. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1942).
36. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 404(g) (2), 56 Stat. 944.
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by the decedent to the total premiums was included in the decedent's
estate. 37
Although the 1942 statute eliminated the troublesome "policies taken
out by the decedent" phrase and substituted specific grounds for inclu-
sion, it did little to clarify those grounds. The statute did not explain
what constituted payment of premiums nor what was considered an
incident of ownership. Congress did not explain why it adopted the
either-or test; aside from a straightforward statement that the payment-
of-premiums test was designed to prevent tax avoidance, the legislative
history of the section specified no further reason.8 8 Nor did the amend-
ment add to pre-existing understanding of the term "payment of prem-
iums." Although the legislative history did not explain why the test was
adopted, the committee reports did provide a detailed list of examples of
incidents of ownership that became quite significant. Portions of the
current regulations, for example, are taken directly from these commit-
tee reports.39 The legislative history also does not explain why Con-
gress adopted the provision including policy proceeds in the estate when
the decedent possessed an incident of ownership "exercisable either
alone or in conjunction with any other person."
Without specific congressional indication of the reason for the either-
or test, courts have struggled to explain why taxation is or is not justified
in a particular instance. Recently courts have relied on the general
theory of the estate tax in cases involving a decedent-insured who
acquired an insurance policy within three years of his death, retained no
incidents of ownership, but continued to pay premiums on the policy
until his death.,0  The taxpayers argued that only the value of the
37. Id.
38. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 162-63 (1942) provides:
Payments of premiums or other consideration by the decedent include pay-
ments made by him directly or indirectly. This provision is intended to pre-
vent avoidance of the estate tax and should be construed in accordance with
this objective. For example, if the decedent transfers funds to his wife so that
she may purchase insurance on his life, and she purchases such insurance, the
payments are considered to have been made by the decedent even though they
are not directly traceable to the precise funds transferred by the decedent. A
decedent similarly pays the premium or other consideration if payment is made
by a corporation which is his alter ego or by a trust whose income is taxable
to him, as, for example, a funded insurance trust. Payment is also made by
the decedent if the decedents employer makes payment as compensation for
services. These examples merely illustrate the concrete application of the pro-
vision.
39. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1974).
40. See, e.g., Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir.
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premiums paid should be included in the gross estate because only that
amount had been diverted from the decedent's gross estate. Most courts
rejected this argument, however, adopting the more accurate position
that the estate and gift taxes are event taxes which focus not on the
depletion of the decedent's gross estate but on the occurrence of a
taxable event. That taxable event has always been tied to the term
"transfer," but the Supreme Court in Chase defined "transfer" very
broadly.41
By adopting the either-or test in 1942, Congress attempted to exercise
its taxing power to the fullest by using a two-fold criterion to define a
taxable transfer or event. Though the statute by its terms did not
require either a taxable event or a transfer, it did require one of two
potentially taxable events: the payment of premiums by the decedent or
the lapse of an incident of ownership at his death. The Treasury
Regulations prior to 1942 had taxed policy proceeds only if the decedent
paid the premiums; Congress' adoption of the either-or test recognized
that a taxable event can occur even if the decedent does not pay the
premiums. Thus, to exercise its taxing power to the fullest, Congress
adopted the alternative tests for taxation.
The Supreme Court held the premium payment test of the 1942 law
constitutional,42 rejecting a challenge that it created an unapportioned
direct tax.43 Assuming that the decedent retained no incident of owner-
ship until his death, the Court relied on Chase for the proposition that
whether the decedent had transferred an interest directly to the benefi-
1972); Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971); First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970); Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 330. Many recent
articles have considered the relationship of §§ 2035 and 2042. See, e.g., Coale, The
Ghost of the Premium Payment Test Lives On, 59 A.B.A.J. 1327 (1973); Eliasberg,
Contemplation of Death and Estate Taxation of Life Insurance, 111 TRJsTs & EsT. 690
(1972); Grant, Premium Payment Tests: Dead or Alive?, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 60 (1974);
Graves & Finley, Irrevocable Term Life Insurance Trusts and Gifts in Contemplation of
Death Under Section 2035, 32 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 855 (1975) & 1976 INS. L.J.
127-46; Hopwood, An Outline of the Federal Estate Taxation of Life Insurance, 11
Hous. L REv. 42, 55-64 (1973); Rhodes, Contemplation of Death-the Problem of Life
Insurance Premiums, 24 TAx. LAw. 589 (1971); Rosenberg, Section 2035-Premium
Payments Made in Contemplation of Death, 51 TAXEs 468-76 (1973); 38 Mo. L. REv.
710 (1973); 5 N.C. CEr. LJ. 268 (1974); 44 U. CoLo. L. 1Ev. 633 (1973); 34 U.
Prrr. L. Rav. 604 (1973).
41. Chase Natl Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 337 (1929).
42. United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960).
43. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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ciaries was irrelevant.4 4 The Court held that the decedent's death was a
taxable "transfer" even though he had only paid the premiums, because
his death provided "the 'generating source' of the full value of the
proceeds.40
C. Internal Revenue Code of 1954
Congress amended the statute again in 1954 and has not altered it
since."' A minor 1954 alteration included a reversionary interest worth
more than five percent of the policy value immediately before the
decedent's death as an incident of ownership. The major alteration
contained in the 1954 Code eliminated the premium payment test for
inclusion and made possession of an incident of ownership at death the
sole criterion for inclusion. Congress did not believe it lacked the
power to use the premium payment test; it merely felt that equitable
considerations argued against the exercise of such power:
No other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent ini-
tially purchased it and then long before his death gave away all rights
to the property.
...To place life-insurance policies in an analogous position to
other property, however, it is necessary to make the 5-percent rever-
sionary interest rule, applicable to other property, also applicable to
life insurance.47
A minority of the House Ways and Means Committee attacked the
elimination of the premium payment test:
It is sought to justify the change as merely putting life insurance on
a par with other property which may be given away free from estate
tax if the gift is not made "in contemplation of death." But life in-
surance is not like other property. It is inherently testamentary in na-
ture. It is designed, in effect, to serve as a will, regardless of its invest-
ment features. 48
The minority view is clearly wrong. Many cases have directly held that
life insurance is not inherently testamentary. The definitions of life
insurance discussed above clearly establish that life insurance constitutes
44. United States v. Manufacturers Nat'I Bank, 363 U.S. 194, 199 (1960).
45. Id. at 198.
46. I.R.C. § 2042, quoted in note 1 supra.
47. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & An. NEws 4025, 4118.
48. H.R. RP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. B14, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4025, 4608.
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more than the mere right to proceeds on the death of the insured, and
that its significant investment features justify treating life insurance the
same as other property for estate tax purposes. 49
In contrast to the 1942 situation, Congress' purpose for altering the
test for inclusion in 1954 was clear. Congress had the constitutional
power to tax life insurance proceeds on the basis of premiums paid, but
chose to restrict its use of that power so that life insurance proceeds
would be included only when the decedent possessed an incident of
ownership. Other than providing that a five percent reversionary inter-
est qualified as an incident of ownership, however, Congress did not
define the interests to be treated as incidents of ownership, again leaving
that task to the courts and Treasury Regulations.
II. DEFINING AN "INCIDENT OF OwNERS-IP" GENERALLY
As noted earlier, 50 section 2042 of the current Code5' requires that
the proceeds of life insurance policies payable to other beneficiaries5 2 be
included in the insured's gross estate if at his death he possessed, alone
or in conjunction with another person, any of the incidents of ownership
of the policy.53 Although the statute has never defined "incident of
ownership," both the Senate and House Reports of 1942 shed some light
on Congress' intent:
There is no specific enumeration of incidents of ownership, the
possession of which at death forms the basis for inclusion of insurance
proceeds in the gross estate, as it is impossible to include an exhaustive
list. Examples of such incidents are the right of the insured or his
estate to the economic benefits of the insurance, the power to change
the beneficiary, the power to surrender or cancel the policy, the power
to assign it, the power to revoke an assignment, the power to pledge
the policy for a loan, or the power to obtain from the insurer a loan
against the surrender value of the policy. Incidents of ownership are
not confined to those possessed by the decedent in a technical legal
sense. For example, a power to change the beneficiary reserved to a
49. See Annot., 85 L.Ed. 1001, 1004 (1941); Swihart, Federal Taxation of Life
Insurance Wealth, 37 IND. L.J 167 (1962).
50. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
51. I.R.C. § 2042, quoted in note 1 supra.
52. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
53. I.R.C. § 2042. Section 2042 does not, nor was it intended to, affect inclusion
under other sections of the Code. S. RP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 236 (1942);
H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1942). See generally 54 MARQ. L. RaV.
370 (1971); 52 N.C. L. REv. 671 (1974).
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corporation of which the decedent is sole stockholder is an incident
of ownership in the decedent . . .54
The Treasury incorporated this language into Regulation 20.2042-
1 (c)(2) in 1954, but with significant alterations:
[T]he term "incidents of ownership" is not limited in its meaning to
ownership of the policy in the technical legal sense. Generally speak-
ing, the term has reference to the right of the insured or his estate to
the economic benefits of the policy. Thus it includes the power to
change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the
policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to
obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy,
etc.7
Both the legislative history and Regulation 20.2042-1(c)(2) state that
legal ownership is not required for possession of an "incident of owner-
ship." While the legislative history lists the right to economic benefits
as only one of a number of considerations, the Regulation implies that
the right to economic benefit is the basic criterion of an incident of
ownership and that the other factors were intended only to serve as
examples of incidents that may be of economic benefit. This slight
alteration in language has caused courts considerable difficulty; for
example, one taxpayer relied on the language of the Regulation requir-
ing economic benefit, coupled with the statement that "incident of
ownership" is not limited to technical legal ownership, to argue that the
taxpayer must have real control, not just ownership, over economic
benefits before inclusion is proper.56
Although courts have been forced to wrestle with the problem of
defining "incidents of ownership" without statutory guidance, some
basic principles governing the defining process are well established. One
such principle is that whether the insured retained any incident of
ownership at his death is a determination of fact, not lav 7 and the
54. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1942).
55. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1954).
56. United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir.
1966).
57. United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir.
1966); Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1965); Hall v.
Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959); Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564 (W.D.
Pa. 1952), afrd, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953); Estate of Michael Collino, 25 T.C. 1026
(1956).
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burden rests on the taxpayer to show non-possession of all incidents."8
Furthermore, factual questions, including the insured's rights under the
policy, are controlled by state or other applicable law; federal law
determines only whether the rights recognized under state law are
sufficient to justify federal estate taxation.59 Two types of facts arise in
life insurance cases: "policy facts" revealed by the policy terms; and
outside-the-policy, or "intent," facts revealed by the conduct and intent
of the parties, either subjectively or objectively determined. 0 Courts
have generally held that only policy facts are relevant to the determina-
tion of whether the decedent retained any incidents of ownership.01
These general principles, however, are of little real aid in defining an
"incident of ownership."
Ownership in this context is clearly not restricted to legal title.0 2
Unlike other sections of the Code, which require property to be included
only to the extent of the decedent's interest in the property held,00
section 2042 provides that the entire insurance proceeds are included in
the insured's estate whenever his interest is sufficient to amount to an
"incident of ownership. 064  Section 2042 imposes the tax whether the
insured holds the incident of ownership alone or in conjunction with
another person; 5 this too suggests that the insured's ownership need not
58. See, e.g., note 57 supra.
59. See, e.g., Parson v. United States, 460 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1972); Landorf v.
United States, 408 F.2d 461, 466 (CL Cl. 1969) (citing Morgan v. Commissioner, 309
U.S. 78, 80 (1940); and Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932)); Wissbrun, Bosch
and Its Aftermath: The Effect of State Court Decisions on Federal Tax Questions, 114
ThusTs & EsT. 8 (1975).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.
1966); Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp. 1365 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Eliasberg, The Estate
Taxation of Life Insurance: A Survey of Recent Developments, 26 U.S. CAL. 1974 TAX
INsT. 1. But see Doing v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 115 (1972).
61. Compare, e.g., materials cited note 60 supra, with Morton v. United States, 322
F. Supp. 1139 (S.D. W. Va. 1971), aft'd, 457 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1972) (decedent's
intent considered).
62. See notes 54 & 55 supra and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2033.
64. I.R.C. § 2042 provides in pertinent part:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.-To the extent of the amount receiv-
able by all other beneficiaries [from policies] . . . with respect to which the
decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership. .. . (em-
phases added).
65. I.R.C. § 2042(2). See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Karagheusian, 233 F.2d
197 (2d Cir. 1956); Godfrey v. Smyth, 180 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1950); Hall v, Wheeler,
174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959).
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be full legal ownership, and that the term "incident" includes partial or
fractional interests.
Although the term "incident" itself suggests that the interest being
taxed is only fractional and incomplete, and although ownership may be
incomplete in a technical legal sense but still justify taxation, neither of
these rationales offers any real help in deciding what interests should
qualify as incidents of ownership. In general, courts have interpreted
the rule that less than full legal ownership may qualify as an "incident of
ownership" to mean that control or power over the insurance policy is a
sufficient indication of an incident even though that power does not
amount to ownership. This definition appears to coincide with the
examples in the House and Senate Reports; for instance, power to
designate the beneficiaries of the policy may be equivalent to substantial
control over the policy although it does not amount to full ownership of
the policy in a technical sense. Merely recognizing that power is what is
contemplated by the term "incident of ownership," however, does not
provide a useful guideline to apply to specific factual situations.
The "power" must probably be a legal right, although the ownership
need not be legal ownership; mere naked power to control a policy does
not require inclusion."6 On the other hand, the insured-decedent need
not have physical possession of the policy in order to possess an "inci-
dent of ownership." In Commissioner v. Estate of Noel,17 the Supreme
Court's most recent decision regarding incidents of ownership, the tax-
payer's wife purchased flight insurance policies on his life shortly before
he died in a plane crash. Though his wife applied and paid for the
policies, the policy terms reserved to the insured the right to change the
beneficiary. Arguing that the proceeds should be excluded from the
decedent's estate, the executors contended that even if the right to
change beneficiaries is ordinarily an incident of ownership, Noel's power
should not be so considered since it was physically impossible for him to
exercise the power to change beneficiaries while he was in flight and the
policy was on the ground. The Supreme Court rejected this argument:
"We hold that estate tax liability for policies 'with respect to which the
decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership' de-
66. Estate of Bartlett v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1590 (1970), Estate of Bert L.
Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199 (1966). But see United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355
F.2d 7 (lst Cir. 1966).
67. 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
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pends on a general, legal power to exercise ownership, without regard to
the owner's ability to exercise it at a particular moment." 8 The Court
pointed out that it is possible for an insured to divest himself of
all incidents of ownership and thus prevent inclusion, but noted that
Noel's was not such a case. 69 The Court's emphasis on "a general, legal
power" supports the conclusion that an "incident of ownership" entails
some degree of control, albeit less than full ownership. Such a broad
statement, however, is of little help in drawing the difficult line between
an insignificant amount of control, and the degree of dominion tanta-
mount to substantial ownership which justifies taxation.7 0
Courts have had no difficulty resolving some cases even in the absence
of clearly drawn guidelines, as when the decedent retained all the
incidents of ownership mentioned in the Regulations. 7 1 Similarly, cases
in which the single incident of ownership retained is one specifically
mentioned in the Regulations have been easily resolved. Thus, courts
consistently have included insurance proceeds in the decedent's estate
when he retained the right to change the beneficiary,7" to surrender the
policy for its cash surrender value or to obtain loans, 78 or to revoke or
assign the policy.74
68. Id. at 684. See also Adeline S. Davis, 27 T.C. 378, 382 (1956).
69. 380 U.S. at 684.
70. See generally Berall, Use of Life Insurance in Estate Planning-Recent Develop-
ments, 1973 N.Y.U. 31sT INST. FED. TAX. 793.
71. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Pa. 1966), rev'd on
other grounds, 372 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1967).
72. E.g., Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929); Morton v. United
States, 457 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1972); Nance v. United States, 430 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.
1970); Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1965); Farwell v.
United States, 243 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Estate of Karagheusian,
233 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956); Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952);
Broderick v. Keefe, 112 F.2d 298 (1st Cir.), cert. dismissed, 311 U.S. 721 (1940); Hall
v. Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959); Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Johnson, 123 F. Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Estate of Michael Collino, 25 T.C. 1026
(1956); Rev. Rul. 65-222, 1965-2 C.B. 374; LOWNDES, supra note 4, at 330 n.37.
73. E.g., Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1968); Commissioner v.
Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1951); Liebmann
v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945); Estate of Bryan S. McCoy, Sr,, 30 T.C.M.
(P-H) 237 (1961).
74. E.g., Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp. 1365 (M.D. Tenn. 1969). A power to
revoke an assignment only in conjunction with the assignee, however, cannot be an
incident of ownership or there could never be a divestiture of all incidents by assignment.
Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461, 470 (Ct. Cl. 1969). Many articles have been
written on assigning group life insurance policies. See, e.g., Lewis, Revenue Ruling 68-
334 and Assignment of Group-Term Life Insurance Policies, 47 TAxEs 72 (1969); 34
FonRnLm L. Rnv. 269 (1965).
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In many cases, however, the courts have encountered problems deter-
mining whether more tenuous types of control retained by the decedent
are sufficient to warrant taxation. For example, courts disagree as to
whether the retention of rights to control the timing or manner of
payment of policy proceeds should result in inclusion.Th Similarly,
when the decedent's power is a negative one, such as the right to veto a
sale or investment of policy proceeds, courts have had trouble deciding
whether that power should be taxed. 0 It is now clearly established that
the ability to terminate insurance by quitting a job, once considered
sufficient control to justify taxation, is not of itself a taxable "incident of
ownership. 77
In Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner7 the Tax Court faced a
factual situation that presented an equally troublesome problem in
defining control. The decedent's employer had insured the decedent
under a group term life insurance policy for which the employer paid all
premiums and named the beneficiaries; the employee-insured's only
power over the policy was a right to alter the monthly amounts to be
paid to his wife in settlement of the policy at his death and, by reducing
the amounts, to spread the payments over a longer period of time. The
Tax Court, finding that the benefits provided by the policy were "care-
fully circumscribed '7 and that exercise of the right to select between
settlement options "could not benefit the decedent or his estate,"'80 held
that decedent possessed no taxable incident of ownership.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and included the policy
proceeds in the decedent-insured's estate." The court examined the tax
75. Compare, e.g., Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 815 (1971), rev'd,
474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973), with Estate of Connelly v. United States, 398 F. Supp.
815 (D.N.J. 1975), and May Billings, 35 B.T.A. 1147 (1937).
76. See United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966).
See also Commissioner v. Estate of Karagheusian, 233 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956); Du
Charme's Estate v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1947), modified on rehearing,
169 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1948); Goldstein's Estate v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 667 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1954); Rev. Rul. 75-70, 1975-1 C.B. 301.
77. Compare Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 853 (1950), with Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969)
(position acquiesced to by Internal Revenue Service, Rev. Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 C.B.
307).
78. 56 T.C. 815 (1971).
79. Id. at 822.
80. Id. at 824.
81. 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally 10 Hous. L. Rav. 984
(1973).
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effect of control over the timing of payment under other sections of the
Internal Revenue Code. The Supreme Court had previously held that
under section 20382 the retention of a power to accelerate or delay the
time of enjoyment of property constituted a taxable "power to alter,
amend, or revoke" within the statutory definitionAs3 The Supreme
Court had also ruled that the same sort of power, even if exercisable
only over trust income but not corpus, was a significant power justifying
taxation under section 2036.4 Relying on these decisions and a
perceived congressional intent to treat life insurance like other forms of
property, 5 the Fifth Circuit stated: "Quite clearly the lesson to be drawn
from [these cases] is that the right to alter the time and manner of
enjoyment does give its holder a substantial degree of control. .. .
Perhaps the most difficult problem of defining substantial control
arises when the insurance policy is held in trust and the decedent-
insured holds some trust powers in a fiduciary capacity. Generally, the
powers granted in the trust instrument are the kind that would ordinari-
82. I.R.C. § 2038 provides in pertinent part:
(a) In General.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property-
(1) Transfers After June 22, 1936.-To the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in
case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof
was subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of
a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by
the decedent in conjunction with any other person (without regard to
when or from what source the decedent acquired such power), to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is relinquished in
contemplation of decedent's death.
83. Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
84. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966). I.R.C. § 2036 provides in
pertinent part:
(a) General Rule.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise,
under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death, or for any period which does not in fact end
before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from,
the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to desig-
nate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom.
85. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text. But see Eel v. United States, 452
F.2d 683, 690 (5th Cir. 1971).
86. 474 F.2d at 1097.
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ly be considered substantial control; the insured's right to exercise that
control is qualified, however, because he holds it in a fiduciary capacity.
As a fiduciary, the insured is restricted by a duty of loyalty, which
prohibits self-dealing and requires that the trust property be adminis-
tered solely in the best interests of the beneficiaries;87 trustees' fiduciary
duties are particularly stringent.88 Although the trustee's duties and
powers generally depend on the terms of the trust, the duty of loyalty
arises not from express terms of the trust but from the fiduciary relation-
ship itself.s" Thus, when the insured-decedent is also a trustee, he is
bound as a fiduciary to exercise his retained powers in the best interests
of the beneficiaries and to avoid self-dealing.
Although neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has definitively
established a single, specific definition of incidents of ownership, the
legislative history, statutory changes, and court interpretations reveal a
general framework within which proceeds are subject to the estate tax.
Congress demonstrated a clear intent to treat life insurance like other
property and for that reason eliminated the premium payment test for
inclusion. The new test for inclusion, however, is not exactly the same as
the test for inclusion of other property: insurance proceeds are includi-
ble in a decedent's gross estate if at death he possessed an "incident of
ownership." An incident of ownership does not entail full legal title or
ownership, but does require some degree of legal power to exercise
ownership, whether or not exercisable in fact at any particular mo-
ment."0 Though the power need not be exercisable by the decedent-
insured alone, nor exercisable for his economic benefit, a purely de
minimis power is not an incident of ownership. Thus, although a
power to surrender or cancel a policy in some circumstances may be an
incident of ownership, a power to terminate a group life insurance policy
by quitting one's job is not an incident of ownership."' Some substan-
tial degree of control or power is required before imposition of the tax is
proper. Although the substantiality required is not quantifiable in an
absolute sense, the estate tax's constitutional basis as an event tax
requires that the degree of control at least be sufficient to comply with
87. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 95, at 343-50 (5th ed. 1973); A.
ScowT, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 170, at 319 (1960).
88. A. ScoTr, supra note 87, § 2.5, at 24.
89. Id. § 164, at 308.
90. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
91. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
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the Chase rationale for taxation: Does termination of the decedent's
control or power at his death free the beneficiaries from the possibility
of its exercise and thus complete the shift of economic benefits from the
decedent to the beneficiaries? 92 As Congress recognized when it re-
fused to define an "incident of ownership" more explicitly,98 this ques-
tion is properly answered on a case-by-case basis.
IMl. INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP HELD IN
FIDUCIARY CAPACITY
After adoption of the incident of ownership test, several courts con-
sidered the tax consequences of insurance policies held in trust. The
Tax Court ruled that the exercise of control inherent in the settlor's
creation of a trust with the attendant restrictions and proscriptions of the
trust instrument did not warrant inclusion in the decedent's gross es-
tate. 94 In a later case, however, in which decedent's wife created a trust
composed of several insurance policies on the decedents life and re-
served the right to alter the trust with the consent of the decedent and
their daughter, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax
Court's decision that the proceeds were not includible in the decedent's
estate. The Tax Court's rationale was that the statute taxed only
incidents of ownership with respect to the policy; the Second Circuit,
however, ruled that the power to change the beneficiary constitutes an
incident of ownership whether the power is exercisable through amend-
ment of the trust or is granted by the policy itself. 95
In some situations, however, the policy is held in trust and the
decedent-insured's powers are held in a fiduciary capacity. Two early
decisions considering this set of facts held that the decedent retained no
incident of ownership. In Estate of Newcomb Carlton," s the taxpayer
created an irrevocable trust, transferred policies on his life to the trust,
and granted the trustees all powers except the right to remove the trustee
and appoint a new one, which he retained. The Tax Court excluded
the policies from the decedent's gross estate, stating:
92. Chase Nat'1 Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929). See text accompany-
ing notes 22-28 & 42-45 supra.
93. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
94. Estate of Powell Crosley, Jr., 47 T.C. 310 (1966).
95. Estate of Miran Karagheusian, 23 T.C. 806 (1955) (no incident), rev'd, 233
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956) (finding an incident).
96. 34 T.C. 988 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).
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Any control that decedent would have acquired over the insurance
policies had he appointed himself cotrustee would have been control
over the policies jointly with the corporate trustee as trustee only and
such control would be solely for the benefit of the trust. Such control
as trustee would not constitute incidents of ownership in the insurance
policies except in his capacity as trustee for the benefit of the trust.97
Similarly, in Estate of Bert L. Fuchs,98 the Tax Court excluded
insurance proceeds from the decedent's gross estate on the ground that a
fiduciary duty bound the decedent to exercise his powers over the policy
for the benefit of the beneficiary. In Fuchs, two business partners
agreed to purchase insurance on each other's life, with the insured
partner retaining no rights in the policy. The insurance agent, however,
neglected to alter the policies to eliminate each insured's rights in the
policies. Nonetheless, the Tax Court found that the partners' agreement
restricted the powers granted in the policies:
Each insured herein was under no less of a legal duty to respect the
terms of the partners' agreement than a common trustee legally obligated
to respect the terms of a trust indenture. Decedent merely had the same
type of power over the. . . policies as a trustee's power to affect trust
proceeds. We do not believe that this type of naked power alone is suf-
ficient to bring the insurance proceeds within the decedent's gross
estate. 9
The first recent case directly considering the issue of incidents of
ownership held in a fiduciary capacity was Estate of Harry R.
Fruehauf;1'0 the decedent's wife, who predeceased him by fourteen
months, purchased several insurance policies on his life, and placed the
policies in a testamentary trust which named the decedent co-trustee and
income beneficiary. The trustees were empowered to retain or assign the
policies, to pay the premiums, to designate themselves as beneficiaries,
and to sell or convert the policies for their cash surrender value. Reject-
ing the taxpayer's argument that only a right to economic benefits can
qualify as an incident of ownership, the Tax Court stated that the
trustees' powers were clearly sufficient to constitute incidents of owner-
ship justifying inclusion in the decedent's gross estate had the decedent
97. Id. at 996.
98. 47 T.C. 199 (1966).
99. Id. at 204. See also 49 N.C. L. REv. 539 (1971); 48 NoTre DA~m LAw 995
(1973).
100. 50 T.C. 915 (1968), affd, 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970). See generally 32 MD.
L REv. 305 (1972).
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not held the powers in his capacity as trustee.1"1 Considering the effect
of the trustee capacity, the court looked to analogous cases under section
2038 in which the taxpayer had argued that property subject to a limited
power to alter, amend, or revoke held in a fiduciary capacity should not
be taxed."0 2 This argument was rejected in one section 2038 case on
the ground that the capacity in which the power could be exercised was
immaterial because the section specifies only the existence of the power,
not the capacity in which it is exercised.' 03 Because section 2042 also
makes no specific reference to the capacity in which incidents of owner-
ship are held, the Tax Court ruled that application of section 2042 is
appropriate whenever such incidents of ownership exist.'0 4
In a concurring opinion, one judge agreed with the result only
because, under the specific facts presented in Fruehauf, the decedent's
power as trustee to surrender the policies could be exercised for his
personal benefit. The decedent could surrender the policies for their
cash value and, by increasing the amount of cash in the corpus, directly
increase his income from the trust; in this situation the power, even
though held in a fiduciary capacity, could be used for personal benefit
and therefore should be taxed. 0 5 The concurring judge cautioned,
however, that "the case should not be read to hold that any power in the
nature of an incident of ownership exercisable by an insured decedent in
his fiduciary capacity causes the proceeds of the policy to be included
in his gross estate.' ' 10
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court solely on the basis of the
concurring opinion.'1 7  The court noted that the Tax Court had relied
101. 50 T.C. at 919-20 (citing Estate of Myron Selznick, 15 T.C. 716 (1950), a! 'd
per curiam, 195 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1952) (power to cancel)); Estate of Michael
Collino, 25 T.C. 1026 (1956) (right to change beneficiary); see United States v. Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966) (several powers including right to
change beneficiary); Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945) (right to cash
surrender value); Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959) (right to change
beneficiary); Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Pa. 1952), af'd, 202 F.2d 150
(3d Cir. 1953) (right to change beneficiary).
102. 50 T.C. at 924.
103. Id. at 924-25 (citing Estate of Albert E. Nettleton, 4 T.C. 987, 991 (1945)).
See also Van Beuren v. McLoughlin, 262 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 991 (1959); Loughridge's Estate v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 294 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 830 (1950); Union Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 138 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 764 (1944); Welch v. Terhune, 126 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1942).
104. 50 T.C. at 924.
105. Id. at 926.
106. Id.
107. 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970). At least one commentator has approved denial of
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on cases arising under section 2038 and its predecessor to support its
"broad per se rule that possession by a decedent of powers constituting
incidents of ownership in insurance policies on his life, regardless of the
capacity in which they are held, always requires inclusion of the pro-
ceeds of the policies in the decedent's gross estate."108  The court re-
jected the Tax Court's per se rule. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that
section 2038 cases are distinguishable since section 2038 applies
only to a decedent who is the transferor of the property, whereas the
decedent in Fruehauf held the power solely as a fiduciary transferee,
so that termination of his power at death was not a substitute for a
testamentary disposition by him.?°  The court also considered the
broad per se rule inappropriate because the Tax Court had held in
Fuchs and Carlton that fiduciary restraints upon incidents of ownership
result in exclusion of the proceeds from the decedent's estate." 0 Though
it rejected a per se rule of inclusion regardless of the capacity in which
the proceeds are held, the Sixth Circuit nonetheless held that inclusion
of the proceeds in Fruehauf's estate was justified because he could have
used the power for his personal economic benefit."' The Court of Ap-
peals rejected the taxpayer's argument that because the estate had never
distributed property to the trust the decedent was unable to exercise his
power or receive benefit, ruling that the existence of the power, not the
ability to exercise it at any particular moment, is the crucial factor for
tax purposes. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that a
general fiduciary duty of loyalty prevented the decedent from exercising
the power for his personal benefit. Recognizing the general rule that
fiduciaries may not benefit from their positions, the court nevertheless
stated that the general rule is inapplicable when the trust instrument
empowers the trustees to benefit themselves, as in Fruehauf."'
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Fruehauf appropriately rejected a
broad per se rule in favor of case-by-case analysis of specific facts.
inclusion where the settlor-trustee merely retained purely administrative powers. Berall,
Use of Life Insurance in Estate Planning-Recent Developments, 1973 N.Y.U. 31sT
INST. FED. TAx. 1053, 1070.
108. 427 F.2d at 83.
109. Id. at 84 (citing Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933); and Commission-
er v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 82 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1936)).
110. Id. (citing Estate of Newcomb Carlton, 34 T.C. 988 (1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962) (trust); and Estate of Bert L. Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199
(1966) (partnership purchase agreement creating fiduciary relationship)).
111. Id. at 85.
112. Id. at 86 (citing, inter alia, G.G. BOoERT, TRusTs AND TRUSTEES § 129 (2d ed.
1965); 2 A. SCOTT, ScOrT ON TRusTS § 170.23, 170.9 (3d ed. 1967)).
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Further, the court correctly rejected the analogy to section 2038 cases:
the statutory language of the sections is materially different; the legisla-
tive history of section 2042 suggests only that life insurance should be
treated like other property, not that section 2042 is to be interpreted like
the other estate tax sections; and neither the statute nor legislative history
indicates that the two sections are to be construed in pari materia. The
court properly looked at the degree of control legally exercisable in light
of fiduciary restrictions, without regard to the taxpayer's physical power
to exercise that control for his economic benefit. The court erred,
however, in considering the source of the decedent's power. The dece-
dent's status as transferee or transferor is irrelevant under the language
of the statute," 3 which imposes a tax whenever a person dies possessing
an incident of ownership, regardless of how or why he acquired posses-
sion. The source of the power of ownership is also irrelevant under the
constitutional rationale set out in Chase: the taxable event occurs when
death terminates the decedents power over the property and completes
the transfer of benefit to the beneficiary. As long as the decedent
possessed such a power, his death has this consequence regardless of
how he acquired the power.
The issue raised in Fruehauf was presented again under slightly
different facts in Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner.14  The decedent in
Skifter purchased policies on his own life but assigned all interest in the
policies to his wife. She predeceased him and created a testamentary
trust naming him trustee. The trust instrument gave the decedent broad
powers to ignore his general fiduciary duty to balance the remainder and
income beneficiary interests and instead to pay the entire corpus to the
income beneficiary if he chose. Unlike the trust in Fruehauf, however,
none of the powers could be exercised for the decedent's personal
benefit, and he had no interest in the trust income or corpus."; The
Tax Court discussed the legislative history of section 2042 and Con-
gress' intent to treat life insurance not as inherently testamentary but
like all other property; the court emphasized that Congress had chosen
this scheme with the knowledge that it would result in substantial
reduction of federal revenues. 1 6 The court felt that the concurring
113. See I.R.C. § 2042, quoted in note 1 supra.
114. 56 T.C. 1190 (1971), affd, 468 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1972). See generally 40
BROoKLYN L. Rav. 1471 (1974); 39 Mo. L. Rav. 258 (1974).
115. 56 T.C. at 1190-95. See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
116. 56 T.C. at 1196 (citing S. RE,. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954)).
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opinion in Fruehauf was inapplicable because no potential for self
benefit was present in Skifter.117 The Commissioner argued that the
case was governed by Regulation 20.2042-1 (c) (4):
A decedent is considered to have an "incident of ownership" in
an insurance policy on his life held in trust if, under the terms of the
policy the decedent (either alone or in conjunction with another person
or persons) has the power (as trustee or otherwise) to change the
beneficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds, or the time or manner
of enjoyment thereof, even though the decedent has no beneficial interest
in the trust."1 "
The Tax Court, however, maintained that to reconcile 20.2042-
l(c)(2)" ° with 20.2042-1(c)(4), and with the legislative history of
section 2042, Regulation 20.2042-1 (c) (4) must be construed to apply
only to transfers of property by the decedent with reservation of powers
by the transferor. 120  Thus, the court suggested that when, as in Frue-
hauf, the decedent's trustee powers were not reserved by him when he
transferred property to a trust but merely transferred to him by his wife,
Regulation 20.2042-1(c)(4) does not apply and the proceeds are ex-
cluded.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of the
life insurance proceeds in Skifter.121 The court reasoned that the
,'reference point" of the regulations was the right to economic benefits,
and that Skifter had no such right. 22  The Second Circuit also accepted
the Tax Court's distinction of Regulation 20.2042-1(c)(4), interpret-
ing the legislative history, the elimination of the premium payments test,
and the introduction of the incidents of ownership test as evidence of
Congress' intent that the treatment of insurance under section 2042
parallel its treatment under other estate tax sections, particularly sections
2036, 2037, 2038, and 2041.' Applying these principles to the facts
of Skifter, the court considered the result that would be reached under
117. Id. at 1197 (citing, inter alia, Estate of Bert L. Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199 (1966) and
Estate of Newcomb Carlton, 34 T.C. 988 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d 415
(2d Cir. 1962)).
118. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (4) (1974).
119. See notes 54 & 55 supra and accompanying text.
120. 56 T.C. at 1198.
121. 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
122. Id. at 701-02 (citing Treas. Reg. § 20.2042 1(c)(2) (1954)).
123. Id. at 702. I.R.C. § 2036 taxes transfers with a retained life estate (see note 84
supra); § 2037 taxes transfers taking effect at death; § 2038 taxes revocable transfers
(see note 82 supra); and § 2041 taxes powers of appointment.
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those other sections. The court determined that if Skifter had possessed
a power exercisable for his own benefit or the benefit of someone he
selected, his power would be equivalent to a power of appointment that
would require inclusion of non-insurance property under section
2041.124 The decedent in Skitter, however, had no such power. Fur-
thermore, the decedent had no power that would justify inclusion of
non-insurance property under either sections 2036 or 2038: Section
2036 applies only to retained powers; and section 2038, despite statuto-
ry language suggesting a contrary result,125 is inapplicable to powers
created after the decedent has divested himself of all rights in the
property.1 26 Because no other section of the estate tax would require
inclusion of non-insurance property, the court concluded that the result
in Skifter should not be different merely because the property consisted
of life insurance.
Although the result reached by the Second Circuit in Skifter may be
proper, the court's analysis was faulty. As noted above, section 2042
should not be construed to tax only insurance property that would be
taxed under one of the other estate tax sections if it were not life
insurance; Congress intended to treat life insurance like other property,
not to ensure that section 2042 is applied like other estate tax sec-
tions.1 2r Furthermore, even if the court's dictum that section 2038
applies only to powers created by the transferor is correct, section 2042
taxes life insurance whenever the decedent possessed incidents of owner-
ship at death regardless of who created the incident or how the decedent
acquired it. The court strained to accept the Tax Court's distinction of
Regulation 20.2042-1(c)(4); the Regulation explicitly states that a
decedent is to be treated as possessing an incident of ownership over a
policy held in trust if he has the power, as trustee or otherwise, to
change the beneficial ownership or the time of payment, regardless of
whether he has any beneficial interest in the trust itself.1 28 Nothing in
the Regulation limits its application to powers reserved by the decedent
as transferor. Instead, the court should probably have invalidated the
124. 468 F.2d at 703. See also Survey of 1974 Federal Estate & Gift Tax Develop-
ments, 32 WAsH. & LEFE L. Rnv. 1017, 1063 (1975).
125. See note 82 supra.
126. 468 F.2d at 703. In Estate of Reed v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,477
(M.D. Fla. 1975), the court accepted the argument that § 2038 applies solely to retained
powers. Surprisingly, the Commissioner has not appealed this decision.
127. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
128. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(4) (1974), quoted in text accompanying note 118
supra.
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Regulation as contrary to the Supreme Court's definition of an incident
of ownership as "a general, legal power to exercise ownership." A
decedent who holds such power in a fiduciary capacity may be disabled
from exercising "ownership," as that term is defined in Chase,' 9 by his
fiduciary duty. If the decedent's only "ownership" power is held in a
fiduciary capacity, it is questionable whether his death completes any
transfer and gives rise to a constitutionally taxable event. Given the facts
of Skifter, the court may have decided correctly that the decedents
fiduciary duty, absent a contrary expression in the trust instrument,
prevented his exercise of any ownership power. The provision of the
trust agreement granting decedent express power to prefer the income
beneficiary to the remainderman without regard to the general fiduciary
duty, however, suggests that Skifter may have been a proper case for
taxation. That determination would properly depend on a detailed
analysis of the trust instrument and the trustees' powers.
One year after the Second Circuit's decision in Skifter, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided Estate of Lumpkin v. Com-
missioner,"' which did not involve a trust. The court relied on
analogies to cases under sections 2038 and 2036, and held that the right
to alter the time and manner of enjoyment of life insurance proceeds
constituted an incident of ownership. The court stated without discus-
sion that section 2038 applies only to retained powers, and found that
the sole difference between sections 2036, 2038, and 2042 was that the
two former provisions require retention of a power while section 2042
permits inclusion whenever the decedent possesses an incident of owner-
ship at death, regardless of the source of such power.'31 Although the
court recognized in a footnote that Skifter and Fruehauf take a contrary
position,' the Fifth Circuit maintained that whether the decedent was
transferor to himself, or merely transferee, was irrelevant.
Following the Lumpkin decision, the specific issue presented in Frue-
hauf and Skirter arose in the Fifth Circuit on slightly different facts.
Unlike cases in which the decedent acquired powers over life insurance
policies on his life from his wife, in Rose v. United States 33 the de-
129. See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
130. 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973). See notes 78-86 supra and accompanying
text.
131. 474 F.2d at 1097.
132. Id. at n.18.
133. 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-1413 (E.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 511 F.2d 259 (5th
Cir. 1975). See generally 43 J. Tax. 49 (1975); 7 ST. MARY'S LJ. 621 (1975).
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cedent's brother had created three irrevocable trusts naming decedent
as trustee. Decedent used trust funds to purchase policies on his own
life, naming his children as beneficiaries after they reached age 18,
and he could convert the policies from whole life to either limited pay-
ment or endowment insurance. The policies themselves also granted
the decedent some powers; he could, for example, obtain a loan from
the insurer on the policy, and withdraw dividends.
The Eastern District of Louisiana held that the policy proceeds were
includible in the decedents gross estate, reasoning that the power to
alter the time and manner of enjoyment of the proceeds through exercise
of the right to withdraw dividends, obtain loans, or convert the policies
was an incident of ownership under the Lumpkin analysis. 18 4 Because
Lumpkin controlled the incident of ownership question, the sole issue
before the court was whether the trustee capacity sufficiently restricted
that incident of ownership to prevent inclusion. The court felt that this
question, too, was controlled by Lumpkin, because the Fifth Circuit had
stated that neither the manner in which decedent acquired the incidents
of ownership nor the capacity in which they could be exercised were
material.185 The court recognized that Fruehauf and Ski!ter held to the
contrary, but considered itself bound by the Lumpkin decision. 18
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's inclusion of the policy
proceeds in the decedent's estate,117 reiterating that Lumpkin had estab-
lished that a power to alter the time or manner of enjoyment constitutes
an incident of ownership. The court also agreed with the decision in
Lumpkin and Skirter to interpret section 2042 so that life insurance
receives parallel treatment to that accorded other property under sec-
tions 2036, 2037, 2038, and 2041. The court went a step further, how-
ever, and explicitly stated that the decedent's status as trustee, not present
in Lumpkin, did not prevent application of the Lumpkin rule: a power
to alter the time or manner of enjoyment of policy proceeds is an inci-
dent of ownership whether or not the exercise of such power is subject
to fiduciary restraints:1 8 The court noted that the Sixth Circuit drew
the opposite conclusion in Fruehauf, but reasoned that the mere exist-
ence of a fiduciary capacity does not automatically deprive the exer-
134. 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 74-1415.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975).
138. Id. at 262.
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cisable control of the substantiality required for inclusion under section
2042. The taxpayer contended that because his fiduciary capacity pre-
vented the decedent from obtaining economic benefit from his powers,
he did not have "substantial control" meriting taxation."" Rejecting
this argument, the court noted that non-economic benefits are also
taxable under the Regulation,'14 and concluded that 20.2042-1(c)(4)141
applied. Applying 20.2042-1 (c) (4) to the facts of Rose, the Fifth
Circuit expressly rejected the Skifter conclusion that 20.2042-1 (c) (4)
applies only to "reservations of powers by the transferor as trustee," 142
and ruled that sections 2036 and 2038 apply only to retained powers but
that section 2042 applies to all incidents of ownership, whether retained
or after-acquired.' 43 Thus, while the court agreed that section 2042
should be construed so that life insurance is taxed in a manner parallel-
ing the estate taxation of other forms of property, it recognized inten-
tional and cognizable differences in the three sections' treatment of
different forms of property.'
Substantially the same issue reappeared in the Fifth Circuit in Terri-
berry v. United States.'41 The decedent's wife created a revocable trust
composed of insurance policies on decedent's life. Decedent was made
co-trustee solely because Florida law did not permit the grantor-wife to
create a revocable trust naming herself sole grantor, trustee, and benefi-
ciary. In light of fluctuations in the estate taxation of life insurance,
however, the trust instrument specifically prohibited the decedent from
exercising in his individual capacity any of the incidents of ownership he
held as trustee. The grantor also retained sole power to alter, amend, or
revoke the trust and to remove the decedent-insured as co-trustee.
The taxpayer paid the estate tax assessed by the Commissioner,
including the tax on the insurance policies, and sued for a refund in the
Middle District of Florida. In an opinion rendered after the district
court decision but prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rose, the
district court excluded the insurance proceeds from the decedent's es-
139. Id. at 263.
140. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1974). See notes 54-56 supra and accompany-
ing text.
141. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (4) (1974). See notes 118-20 supra and accompany-
ing text.
142. 511 F.2d at 265.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 266.
145. 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,759 (M.D. Fla. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
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tate.146 The court adopted the Fruehauf and Skifter rule, distinguishing
Lumpkin and the district court opinion in Rose. The court interpreted
Regulation 20.2042-1(c) (4) to apply only to transferor-created inci-
dents of ownership, and distinguished Lumpkin as not involving owner-
ship held in a fiduciary capacity. 147 Although Rose involved a fiduciary
capacity, the district court distinguished it because the decedent in Rose
acted as sole trustee whereas the decedent in Terriberry acted only as
co-trustee. Further, and perhaps more importantly, Rose involved an
irrevocable trust whereas in Terriberry the trust was revocable; thus, the
decedent's power was wholly ephemeral and the property had been fully
taxed in the wife's estate. 48
The Fifth Circuit heard the case on appeal after its decision in Rose.
Considering itself bound by that decision, it reversed the district court
and included the proceeds in the decedent's gross estate.' 40 The court
stated that Lumpkin established that a power to alter the time or manner
of enjoyment was an incident of ownership; Rose established that an
insured who transferred that power to himself as trustee nevertheless
retained an incident of ownership; and the fact that a third party was the
trust grantor did not dictate a different result.'"0 One judge dissented
on the basis of the district court opinion.' 5'
The Fifth Circuit's analysis in Rose and Terriberry was erroneous.
The court improperly ignored both the effect of capacity on "the gen-
eral legal power to exercise ownership" 5 2 and the specific facts that
affected the degree of control exercisable by the decedent. The court
was correct to refuse to treat life insurance under section 2042 as
other property is treated under other estate tax sections, due to dis-
cernible and intentional differences in treatment. Likewise, the court
correctly rejected the taxpayer's argument that section 2042 should be
interpreted to apply only to decedent-created incidents and not to
incidents held only as transferee. In determining how life insurance
should be treated, however, the court ignored the effect of the capacity
146. Id. See generally 28 TAX LAw. 607 (1975).
147. 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,761-62.
148. The court noted that the wife would pay income tax on the trust property under
§§ 677(a) and 673(a) and estate tax under § 2038. Id. at 85,762.
149. 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
150. 517 F.2d at 289.
151. 517 F.2d at 290.
152. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 684 (1965). See notes 66-70
supra and accompanying text.
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in which an incident of ownership is held upon the taxability of that
power as an incident of ownership.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Terriberry,'53 the cur-
rent conflict among the circuits over the taxation of incidents of owner-
ship held in a fiduciary capacity is likely to continue. Estate planning
requires certainty and predictability, but for the immediate future only
uncertainty is certain. The best estate planning advice to an insured
client who wishes to avoid tax on insurance proceeds, therefore, is to
avoid being named as trustee of any trust containing insurance policies
on his life.
When a decedent-insured has not planned so carefully, however,
courts considering the taxability of incidents of ownership held in a
fiduciary capacity should look at the specific facts of each case, includ-
ing the precise terms of the trust instrument. Though the source of the
powers the decedent possessed at death is irrelevant, the degree of
ownership exercisable through those powers must be considered.154 In
any such consideration the capacity in which the powers are exercisable,
including restraints such as the fiduciary's duty of loyalty, must be given
appropriate weight.
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Terriberry means that, at
least in the Fifth Circuit, courts will not consider capacity. This is
undesirable, but Congress is the only body with power to alter the
situation unless the Supreme Court hears another case with similar facts.
Congress should reconsider the statute and make its intent regarding the
estate taxation of life insurance more clear. The legislature should spell
out the ways in which life insurance is to be treated like other property:
whether the section taxing life insurance is to be construed similarly to
sections taxing other forms of property; whether life insurance is to be
taxed only when the incidents of ownership are created by the transferor
and not merely by a transferee of the policy, as in other sections; and
whether the capacity in which an incident is held should affect taxabili-
ty. Consistent with court interpretations of the statute and the constitu-
tional basis of the estate tax, Congress should consider the decedent's
153. 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
154. But see Note, Federal Estate Tax: Application of the Section 2042 Incidents of
Ownership Concept to the Insured Fiduciary's Estate, 60 IOWA L REv. 1319 (1975).
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power in light of any restraints on its exercise, but ought not to weigh
the source of the power when considering whether to include the proper-
ty in the decedent's gross estate. The legislature should speak to this
issue, affirming or rejecting the courts' analysis, but in any event stating
a clear, certain, and predictable test for taxation when the decedent-
insured's powers are only fiduciary.
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